知识卡·2026-09-15
原始来源 ↗ 约 12 分钟4,521 字2 条来源

2026 年的商业化不是"收更多",是"把交易变成关系"

一句话:2025 年是"hybrid everything"——连买断制游戏都开始做通行证和外观。2026 年的关键词是更聪明而不是更大:更个性化的 offer、更多的直营网店(D2C)、更会用一方数据。用 Xsolla 总裁的原话说,发行商想要的是客户关系,不只是那笔交易。 而这件事之所以重要,是因为当供给彻底过剩时,唯一稀缺的东西变成了注意力。

供给过剩到什么程度

先看两个数字,它们决定了后面所有讨论的前提:

  • Steam 上平均每天上架约 50 款游戏,一年约 18,000 款
  • 全球游戏收入仍在 1,850–1,950 亿美元/年 的量级

注意这两个数字放在一起的含义:需求没有萎缩,但注意力在集中。

Xsolla 的 CMO 把这个诊断说得很准:

"供给饱和了,但注意力才是真正稀缺的商品。问题不是『游戏太多』,而是『太多相似的游戏在争夺同一个曝光渠道』。"

这解释了一个常见的误判:很多人把"游戏太多"当成问题,于是想做"更独特的游戏"。但真正的瓶颈不在独特性,而在相似的产品挤在同一条分发通道上——这是个渠道问题,不是产品问题。


从"交易"到"关系":D2C 为什么是结构性的

整个访谈里最有分量的判断是这一句:

"D2C 不再是一次边缘实验,它正在变成结构性的。"

背景数据:在美国,D2C 与替代支付方式的收入同比增长 26%。欧洲在跟进,部分西欧市场出现两位数增长,个别品类达到 20–30%。亚洲执行得更早——韩国和东南亚的玩家对"发行商自营网店"接受度很高。

为什么这件事的本质是"关系"而不是"渠道"?

因为平台分成模式下,厂商拿到的是一笔交易的钱,拿不到这个用户。用户属于平台。自己开店意味着:

  • 拿到用户联系方式,能做后续触达
  • 能按自己的规则定价与做活动
  • 不需要为每一笔重复交易付分成

推论:D2C 的驱动力不是"省下 30%",而是把一次性交易变成可重复触达的资产。省分成是短期收益,拿到关系是长期收益——后者才是"结构性"的原因。

本卡推断。来源给了 D2C 的增长数据与"结构性"的定性,但没有展开论证。)


30% 抽成不是"平台在收租",它是商业模式的一部分

这段对话值得单独记下来,因为它纠正了一个常见的情绪化判断。

有人问:主机上能不能也做 D2C、绕开平台支付?回答是:

"主机仍然被严格管控。微软、索尼、任天堂设定的计费规则都偏向平台自有支付。30% 的平台抽成在为硬件补贴和生态建设提供资金。 所以除非有监管压力,主机商店内完全绕过平台的 D2C 支付不太可能出现。"

关键在最后半句:30% 不是纯粹的租金,它对应着平台的成本结构——硬件补贴、生态建设、支付与风控。

这个视角为什么重要:它把"平台抽成太高"从一个道德问题变成了一个结构问题。你能谈判的空间,取决于你给平台带来什么;而平台让渡的空间,取决于监管压力和竞争格局,不取决于开发者的抱怨。

现实中的可行路径间接 D2C——通过网店购买游戏内货币或礼包,再同步到主机账号。这是在不触碰平台计费规则的前提下,争取一部分关系与毛利。

理论机制:平台经济中的双边市场定价;本卡推断:把"抽成对应成本"引申为"谈判空间取决于价值贡献"。)


"hybrid everything"意味着买断制也在做长线运营

访谈里有个容易被忽略的观察:

"2025 年感觉是『万物混合』的一年。连买断制游戏都开始做通行证、外观和赛季内容。 那条 live-service 的主线并没有消失,它只是成熟了。"

这修正了一个流行的叙事——"行业正在从长线服务退回买断制"。

更准确的描述是:买断制入口 + 长线服务变现的混合形态在增加(这与 Newzoo 在 GDC 2026 观察到的 Helldivers 2ARC Raiders 模式一致)。

推论:行业变化的不是"要不要做长线运营",而是"用什么方式把用户拉进来"。免费进入的门槛优势在减弱(因为获客成本上升),而买断制的筛选优势在上升(愿意付费的人质量更高)。但进来之后的运营逻辑没有变。


怎么用这个机制

当你在评估"要不要做 D2C / 自营渠道"时,不要按"能省多少分成"来算账,要按"能拿到多少可重复触达的用户关系"来算。前者是几个百分点,后者是资产的归属。

适用范围

  • 有稳定长线收入的产品:D2C 的收益与用户生命周期长度成正比
  • 对平台依赖度高的产品:单一渠道收入占比越高,D2C 的战略价值越大
  • ⚠️ 体量很小的产品:自建支付与客服的成本可能超过收益
  • 纯买断制、无后续内购的产品:没有重复交易,D2C 的意义有限

不迁移的部分:D2C 的落地难度高度依赖地区——欧洲的增值税体系和本地支付方式复杂度会显著拖慢实施,而韩国、东南亚已经跑通。不能把某个地区的经验直接搬到另一个地区。


明天能做的

  1. 算一下你的"平台依赖度":单一平台收入占比是多少?超过 70% 就意味着你的战略自由度低于你的经营能力。 这个数字不需要行动,但需要知道。
  1. 如果你的产品有长线内购,去查一下玩家在你自营渠道的购买意愿。 方法很简单:在社区里问一句"如果官网能买,价格一样,你愿意用吗"。阻力通常比想象的小,尤其在有本地支付方式的情况下。
  1. 重新审视"要不要做长线运营"这个决策。 如果行业已经进入"hybrid everything",那么问题不是"做不做",而是"用买断还是免费把用户拉进来"——这是两个可以分开决策的问题。


附录

来源清单

全部内容来自同一场访谈的两位受访者(Xsolla 总裁 Chris Hewish 与 CMO Berkley Egenes)。注意 Xsolla 本身是游戏商业化服务商,其 D2C 主张与其业务方向一致——立场需折扣。

证据与来源

  • 来源性质:行业访谈(服务商高管),经行业媒体 GamesMarket 报道。
  • 证据等级 B,置信度中:受访者是一线从业者,判断有分量;但属利益相关方观点,且为单一来源
  • 数据口径提醒
  • Steam 日均约 50 款 / 年约 18,000 款——与本库另一张卡引用的 SteamDB 数据(2025 年 21,338 款)量级一致但数值不同,可能是统计口径或年份差异,引用时需注明出处
  • 全球收入 1,850–1,950 亿美元——与 Newzoo 此前给出的 1,960 亿美元(2025 年)存在差异,两套数字不要混用
  • D2C 同比 +26%——来自 AppMagic,仅美国市场,访谈中欧洲的"20–30%"是受访者口述,无具体来源
  • "30% 抽成用于硬件补贴与生态建设"是受访者的解释,不是可验证的财务披露。这是行业内的通行说法,但平台方从未公开过这笔钱的用途明细。

适用边界

  • 服务商立场:Xsolla 的主营业务就是帮厂商做 D2C 与支付,其"D2C 是结构性的"这一判断与其商业利益一致。取机制、对数字与趋势判断保持审慎。
  • 地区差异巨大:D2C 的可行性高度依赖当地支付基础设施与增值税复杂度,不能跨地区照搬
  • 主机与移动的平台规则不同:主机几乎不可能做完整 D2C;移动端受 DMA 等监管影响正在松动。两个平台的结论不要互相套用。
  • 本卡对"关系 vs 交易"的引申、以及"谈判空间取决于价值贡献"的推论,是本卡推断,来源未直接论证

什么证据能推翻它

  1. 如果 D2C 收入在后续年份增速大幅回落(比如降到个位数)→ "结构性"的判断过于乐观,它可能只是一次阶段性的分成博弈
  2. 如果 出现平台主动降低分成或开放支付的案例 → 说明"30% 对应硬件补贴因而不可动"这个解释不成立
  3. 如果 有数据显示 D2C 用户的 LTV 并不高于平台渠道用户 → "拿到关系是长期收益"的推论需要修正

当前推断链上最脆弱的一环:把"更多个性化 offer、更多 D2C、更好用一方数据"这三件事统称为"更聪明的商业化"。但这三件事可能有不同的驱动力——D2C 是分成博弈,一方数据是隐私监管倒逼,个性化 offer 是留存压力。把它们打包成"聪明",可能掩盖了各自的真实约束。

需要什么数据:D2C 用户的留存与 LTV 对照(与平台渠道用户比);平台抽成的真实成本结构(几乎不可能拿到)。

待验证

  • 欧洲 D2C 增长的具体数字与来源
  • D2C 用户与平台渠道用户的 LTV 对照
  • "hybrid everything" 在买断制产品中的实际渗透率
  • 全球游戏收入 1,850–1,950 亿与 Newzoo 1,960 亿的口径差异

**

Monetization in 2026 isn't about charging more — it's about turning transactions into relationships

In one line: 2025 was "hybrid everything" — even premium games started doing battle passes and cosmetics. The 2026 keyword is smarter rather than bigger: more personalized offers, more direct-to-consumer shops, better use of first-party data. In Xsolla's president's words, publishers want the customer relationship, not just the transaction. And that matters because when supply is fully saturated, the scarce commodity is attention.

Terminology follows references/glossary.md.


How saturated supply actually is

Two numbers set up everything that follows:

  • Around 50 games launch on Steam every day — roughly 18,000 a year
  • Global games revenue remains in the $185–195 billion range annually

Put them together and the meaning is clear: demand hasn't shrunk, but attention is concentrating.

Xsolla's CMO puts the diagnosis precisely:

"Supply is saturated, but attention is the real scarce commodity. The issue isn't 'too many games', it's 'too many similar games fighting for the same visibility channels'."

This corrects a common misreading. Many people treat "too many games" as the problem and conclude they need to make something more unique. But the bottleneck isn't uniqueness — it's similar products crowding the same distribution channel. That's a channel problem, not a product problem.


From transaction to relationship: why D2C is structural

The heaviest claim in the interview:

"D2C is no longer a side experiment; it's becoming structural."

The backdrop: in the US, revenue from D2C and alternative payment methods grew 26% year on year. Europe is following, with double-digit growth in several Western European markets and 20–30% in some genres. Asia executes earlier — players in South Korea and Southeast Asia are comfortable with publisher-run web shops.

Why is the essence of this "relationship" rather than "channel"?

Under platform revenue share, a publisher receives money for a transaction, not the user. The user belongs to the platform. Running your own shop means:

  • Getting contact details, enabling follow-up outreach
  • Setting your own pricing and running your own promotions
  • Not paying a cut on every repeat transaction

The implication: the driver behind D2C isn't "saving 30%" — it's turning a one-off transaction into a repeatedly reachable asset. Saving the cut is a short-term gain; owning the relationship is a long-term one. The latter is why it's called structural.

(This is this card's inference. The source provides the growth data and the "structural" characterization, but doesn't argue it out.)


The 30% cut isn't rent — it's part of the business model

This exchange is worth recording on its own, because it corrects an emotional judgment.

Asked whether consoles could also do D2C and bypass platform payment, the answer was:

"Consoles are still tightly controlled. Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo set billing rules that favor platform billing. The 30% platform cut funds hardware subsidies and ecosystem development. So full D2C payment bypass inside console storefronts is unlikely without regulatory pressure."

The key is the last half-sentence: the 30% isn't pure rent — it maps to the platform's cost structure: hardware subsidies, ecosystem building, payments and risk.

Why this framing matters: it turns "platform cuts are too high" from a moral question into a structural one. Your room to negotiate depends on what you bring the platform; the platform's room to concede depends on regulatory pressure and competition — not on developers complaining.

The realistic path is indirect D2C — buying in-game currency or bundles through a web shop that syncs to console accounts. That captures some of the relationship and margin without touching platform billing rules.

(Established mechanism: two-sided market pricing in platform economics. Extending "the cut maps to cost" into "negotiating room depends on value contributed" is this card's inference.)


"Hybrid everything" means premium games are doing live service too

One easily missed observation from the interview:

"2025 felt like the year of 'hybrid everything'. Even premium games leaned into battle passes, cosmetics, and seasonal content. That live-service backbone didn't disappear; it just matured."

This corrects a popular narrative — that the industry is retreating from live service back to premium.

A more accurate description: the hybrid of premium entry plus live-service monetization is growing (consistent with the Helldivers 2 / ARC Raiders pattern Newzoo observed at GDC 2026).

The implication: what's changing isn't "whether to run live service" but "how you get users in the door." The barrier advantage of free entry is eroding as acquisition costs rise, while the filtering advantage of a premium price is growing — people who pay upfront are higher quality. But the operating logic after they arrive is unchanged.


How to use this mechanism

When evaluating whether to build D2C or your own channel, don't run the numbers on "how much of the cut do we save" — run them on "how much repeatedly reachable user relationship do we gain." The former is a few percentage points; the latter is who owns the asset.

Where it applies:

  • Products with stable long-tail revenue — D2C returns scale with user lifetime
  • Products heavily dependent on one platform — the higher the single-channel share, the greater D2C's strategic value
  • ⚠️ Very small products — building payments and support may cost more than it returns
  • Pure premium with no follow-on purchases — no repeat transactions, limited D2C value

What doesn't transfer: D2C difficulty varies enormously by region — European VAT systems and local payment complexity slow implementation significantly, while Korea and Southeast Asia have it working. Don't lift one region's playbook into another.


Three things you can do tomorrow

  1. Work out your platform dependency: what share of revenue comes from a single platform? Above 70% means your strategic freedom is smaller than your operating ability. You don't need to act on the number, but you need to know it.
  1. If your product has long-tail IAP, gauge willingness to buy direct. A simple method: ask your community "if the official site sold the same thing at the same price, would you use it?" Resistance is usually lower than expected, especially where local payment methods exist.
  1. Revisit the "should we do live service" decision. If the industry has moved to "hybrid everything," the question isn't whether, but whether premium or free gets users in the door — two decisions that can be made separately.


Appendix

Source list

All content comes from a single interview with two respondents (Xsolla president Chris Hewish and CMO Berkley Egenes). Note that Xsolla is itself a game commerce vendor — its D2C advocacy aligns with its business, so discount accordingly.

Evidence and sources

  • Source type: industry interview (vendor executives), reported by trade outlet GamesMarket.
  • Evidence tier B, confidence medium: the respondents are working operators and their judgments carry weight, but they are interested parties and the source is singular.
  • Measurement definitions:
  • ~50 games/day on Steam, ~18,000/yearconsistent in magnitude but not in value with the SteamDB figure cited in another card here (21,338 in 2025); possibly a methodology or year difference, so cite the source when quoting
  • $185–195B global revenuediffers from Newzoo's $196B (2025). Don't mix the two sets.
  • D2C +26% YoY — from AppMagic, US market only; the "20–30%" for Europe is verbal, with no stated source
  • "The 30% cut funds hardware subsidies and ecosystem development" is the respondent's explanation, not a verifiable financial disclosure. It's a common industry claim, but platforms have never published a breakdown of where that money goes.

Scope and limits

  • Vendor position: Xsolla's business is helping publishers do D2C and payments, so "D2C is structural" aligns with its commercial interest. Take the mechanism; treat the numbers and trend claims with caution.
  • Large regional variance: D2C feasibility depends heavily on local payment infrastructure and VAT complexity — don't transplant across regions.
  • Console and mobile platform rules differ: full D2C is nearly impossible on console; mobile is loosening under regulation like the DMA. Don't apply conclusions across the two.
  • The extension from "relationship vs transaction" and the inference that "negotiating room depends on value contributed" are this card's own; the source doesn't argue them directly.

What would falsify this

  1. If D2C growth falls to single digits in subsequent years → the "structural" claim was over-optimistic and this may be a phase in the revenue-share fight
  2. If a platform voluntarily lowers its cut or opens up payments → the explanation that "30% maps to hardware subsidies and therefore can't move" doesn't hold
  3. If data shows D2C users' LTV is no higher than platform-channel users → the inference that "owning the relationship is the long-term gain" needs revision

The weakest link in the chain: bundling "more personalized offers, more D2C, better use of first-party data" into one thing called "smarter monetization." These three may have different drivers — D2C is a revenue-share fight, first-party data is pushed by privacy regulation, and personalized offers come from retention pressure. Packaging them as "smarter" may obscure each one's real constraint.

What data would settle it: retention and LTV comparison between D2C and platform-channel users; the true cost structure behind platform cuts (almost certainly unobtainable).

Unverified

  • Concrete European D2C growth figures and their source
  • LTV comparison between D2C and platform-channel users
  • Actual penetration of "hybrid everything" among premium titles
  • The methodology gap between $185–195B and Newzoo's $196B
认知卡 D1 商业模式 / D2 平台经济与渠道权力 证据 B 置信 中 演讲 发布 2026-03-09 跨品类全球框架